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THE PROVABILITY OF TORT CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY.
I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Since the Statute 13 Eliz., C. 7, limited the operation of
the earlier act of 34 Hen. VIII, c. 4, to only such persons
as have "used the trade of merchandise," and provided for
the compulsory liquidation and distribution of the estates
of such traders among their creditors, the character of
Anglo-Saxon legislation upon the subject of bankruptcy has
remained essentially commercial in spirit. The exigencies
of business life provide the need for bankruptcy legislation,
and the evolution of bankruptcy law is the result of statutory revision continued in the effort to adjust the law to
commercial conditions and broaden its scope so that the
remedies of the law may be commensurate with the relief
desired in the business world. The discharge of the bankrupt from debts, the extension of the system so as to include
others than traders, the incorporation of provisions for
voluntary, in addition to those for involuntary, proceedings
473
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mark the progress of bankruptcy legislation. A broader
definition of the term "bankrupt" has enlarged the class of
debtors whose estates may be administered in bankruptcy.
Successive legislation has enlarged the class of creditors who
may take part in the bankruptcy proceedings as the possessors
of provable claims, so that in Ex parte Adainson, L. R.,
8 Ch. Div. 820, it was declared by James, L. J., that "every
debt which a person could, either in his own name or in
the name of any other person, recover at law or in equity
was a provable debt in bankruptcy."
It is only as the possessor of a provable claim that a creditor is a party interested in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Only provable debts are discharged in bankruptcy. Only
those creditors who have provable claims may file or resist
petitions, vote at meetings for the election of trustees or
other purposes, or share in the distribution of the estate.
From the creditor's point of view, participation in the distribution of the estate is the main object of the proceedings.
The more numerous is the class of creditors entitled to prove,
the larger is the number among whom the estate is divided.
Limitations upon the right to prove, therefore, are properly made in accordance with the principles that determine
the limitations that should be placed upon the right to participate in the distribution. In general, those creditors
should share in that distribution whose claims are based
upon liabilities of the bankrupt incurred in and about the
accumulation of the bankrupt's estate. With respect to the
subject of tort claims, it is apparent that in the application
of this general principle it is necessary to distinguish between
those torts which result in the increase of the tort-feasor's
estate, such, for example, as the wrongful taking, withholding, or conversion of another's property, and those
torts which, consisting in the violation of the personal
rights of another, as in the case of libel or assault and battery, result in no increase of the estate of the tort-feasor.
Under the principle stated, the former class of tort claims,
based upon liabilities of the bankrupt incurred in the accumulation of his estate, should be provable in bankruptcy,
while tort claims of a personal character should not be
provable. And this a priori conclusion represents the gen-
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eral state of the law. "Every possible demand, every possible claim, every possible liability, except for personal torts,
is to be the subject of proof in bankruptcy," said James,
L. J., of the English law, in Ex parte Llynvi Coal and Iron
Co., L. R. 7 Ch. App. 28. "The general policy of bankrupt
acts has been not to include in provable debts claims for
damages for personal wrongs," declared a United States
District Court in In re Hirschman,4 A. B. R. 715.
If, then, it is assumed as the first test for the provability
of tort claims, whether they arose from wrongs leading to
the increase of the bankrupt, the tort-feasor's estate, before
the conclusion is drawn that no claims are provable in respect of personal torts, which result in no increase of the
wrong-doer's estate, there is another principle of classification that must be applied. Tort claims may be liquidated
and the cause of action merged in a judgment, or they may

be unliquidated. When reduced to judgment claims for personal torts acquire, as judgments, qualities they theretofore
did not possess. They become a species of property for the
first time. They then become assignable, they pass as property from a decedent to his representatives. As the owner
of a judgment the injured party may issue execution and
out of the estate of the tort-feasor obtain pecuniary satisfaction for the wrong done. When, then, an unliquidated
claim for a personal tort is reduced to judgment it should
be admitted to proof in bankruptcy like all other judgments.
Bankruptcy has been said to be an execution in favor of
all creditors, and though from the class of creditors, within
the meaning of that statement, creditors possessing only
unliquidated claims for personal torts be excluded, there is
no reason to exclude them when their claims are merged
in judgments upon which they could themselves have issued
execution had bankruptcy not intervened. It follows, then,
that tort claims should be provable in bankruptcy when
liquidated and reduced to judgment before the initiation
of bankruptcy proceedings, the time when the provability
of claims is determined; and if not in judgment at that
time, tort claims should be provable when they arise from
wrongs which enriched the bankrupt's estate, and should
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not be provable when they arise from wrongs of a personal
character that do not enrich the bankrupt's estate.
These conclusions represent, speaking broadly, the conclusions to be reached as well from a study of the modern
bankruptcy statutes, English and American, and the decisions construing them, as from a consideration of the
general principles that should determine the question of the
provability of claims.
Since, however, bankruptcy law is statutory, the provability of claims in practice must be determined by a study
of the statute and not from any considerations derived from
general principles. Congress has legislated upon the subject, and according as the Act of 1898 admits of or denies
the right of proof, claims are or are not provable. Only
in the construction of the statute is there any opportunity
for moulding statutory law, as a fact, to conform to the
general results attained under other laws or from general
principles; and it is worthy of notice, as the provisions of
the act itself are considered, to how great an extent the
courts have, by construction, so interpreted the Act of 1898
that the rules above stated, which define the law in England,
and under the Federal Act of 1867, also fairly represent
the conclusions to be drawn from the decisions construing
the Act of 1898 rendered prior to the present time. The
terms of the Act of 1867 differ from those of the Act of
1898; but, while there are authorities to countenance a
contrary view, it is submitted that the cases, whether they
be rightly or wrongly decided, sustain the view that the
law is to-day practically the same as it was under the Act
of 1867 and as it was stated above, so far as concerns the
provability of tort claims.
Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Law of 1898, entitled
"Debts which may be Proved," provides as follows:
a. Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and
allowed against his estate which are (I) a fixed
liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not, with any interest thereon which would
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have been recoverable at that date or with a rebate
of interest upon such as were not then payable and
did not bear interest; (2) due as costs taxable
against an involuntary bankrupt who was at the
time of the filing of the petition against him plaintiff in a cause of action which would pass to the
trustee and which the trustee declines to prosecute
after notice; (3) founded upon a claim for taxable costs incurred in good faith by a creditor before the filing of the petition in an action to recover
a provable debt; (4) founded upon an open ac-

count, or upon a contract express or implied; and
(5) founded upon provable debts reduced to judgments after the filing of the petition and before
the consideration of the bankrupt's application
for a discharge, less costs incurred and interest
accrued after the filing of the petition and up to
the time of the entry of such judgments.
(b) Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt
may, pursuant to application to the court, be liquidated in such manner as it shall direct, and may
thereafter be proved and allowed against the
estate.
It will be observed that there is no specific provision for
the proof of torts. There can be no pretence that under
clauses (2) and (3) of paragraph a, which relate to the
provability of costs, tort claims are provable. Nor does
clause (5)of subsection a admit of the proof of tort claims
not provable under the other clauses of'the section. This
clause does not enlarge the number of provable debts as
defined in the other clauses; it merely preserves their provability if, being provable debts, they are reduced to judgment
after the filing of the petition. Whether or not the debt
thus reduced to judgment is provable depends upon the
other provisions of the section. This leaves for consideration, as possibly warranting the proof of tort claims, clause
(I) of subsection a, providing, inter alia, for the proof of
fixed liabilities, "as evidenced by a judgment;" clause (4)
of subsection a, providing for the proof of debts "founded
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. . . upon a contract express or implied ;" and subsection
b, providing for the liquidation and proof of unliquidated
claims. These are the provisions of the statute under which
tort claims, if at all, may be proved. Recalling the classification of tort claims made above, torts reduced to judgment are within Section 63, a (I); torts not reduced to
judgment, to be provable, must come within Section 63, a
(4), unless Section 63, b, admits of their proof, and, as
will appear, it is conceded that of the unliquidated tort
claims none are within Section 63, a (4), unless they are
based upon torts which result in the unjust enrichment of
the bankrupt, the tort-feasor; if, then, subsection b does
not authorize their proof, unliquidated claims for personal
torts are not provable under the Act of 1898.
II. PROOF OF TORT-CLAIMS REDUCED TO JUDGMENT.

ACT

1898, SECTION 63, a (I).
Judgments obtained prior to the initiation of proceedings
in bankruptcy are provable, upon whatever cause of action
they may have been obtained. Whether the cause of action
was one ex contractu or one ex delicto, or, if ex delicto,
whether the wrong enriched the wrong-doer or was a merely
personal tort, the incidents of the judgments in which they
become merged are alike. Their lien upon the debtor's
real estate is the same. They furnish the same basis for
an execution upon the debtor's property. This right to enforce collection out of the debtor's estate is preserved in
bankruptcy by admitting the judgment creditor to proof,
and, as a provable creditor, to participation in the distribution of the bankrupt estate. The rule is the same under
all statutes, however their phraseology may differ. In England, of a large number of cases, there may be mentioned
Robinson v. Vale, 2 B. & C. 762 (1824), and Greenway v.
Fisher, 7 B. & C. 436 (827), in the former of which a
judgment in an action of trespass de bonis asportatis, and
in the latter a judgment in trover, were declared to be
provable.' The National Bankruptcy Act of 1841 provided:
' See also Williams: Bankruptcy Practice, 8th Edition (19o4), p. 126.
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"That all creditors coming and proving their
debts . . . the same being bona fide debts, shall

be entitled to share in the bankrupt's property and
effects. ..

."

A judgment is a debt whether obtained in a contractual
or a tort action.2 Hence, under the Act of 1841 judgments
in tort actions were provable 3 because "debts" within the
meaning of the statute. In In re Cornstock,4 22 Vt. 642
(1842), Judge Prentiss said: "There is no distinction, under the Bankrupt Law, between a judgment in an action
arising ex delicto, and a judgment in an action arising ex
contractu. They are both debts within the meaning of the
law, and both provable against the estate of the bankrupt."
The language of the Act of 1867 was'not dissimilar. It
provided:
"That all debts due and payable from the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy,
• . . may be proved against the estate of the bankrupt."
In In re Wiggers, 2 Biss. 71 (I868), Judge Drummond
said, "This judgment was recovered for a tort, but it is
still a debt, because it has passed into judgment." Instances
of the admission to proof, as debts, under the Act of 1867,
of judgments obtained in actions for merely personal torts
are found in ln re Hennocksburgh & Block, 7 N. B. R. 37,
where the action was one for assault and battery and false
imprisonment, and Howland v. Carson, 16 N. B. R. 372,
where the action was brought for the seduction of the
plaintiff's daughter.
In clause (I) of subsection a, Section 63, of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 specific provision is made for the proof
of judgments without any discrimination being made as to
the causes of action upon which they may have arisen.
While not numerous, yet the decisions sustain the right to
prove judgments obtained upon tort claims of any nature
whatsoever. A judgment in an action for seduction was
Gray v. Bennett, 3 Metcalf, 522; Stone v. Railroad, 7 Gray, 539.
Comstock v. Grout, 17 Vt. 512. In re Book, 3 McLean, 317.

'A case

in the U. S. District Court for the District of Vermont.
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proved in In re McCarty, 7 A. B. R. 4o.5 In M4'cDonald
v. Brown, IO A. B. R. 58, a judgment was proved which
had been obtained in an action for libel. In In re Yates,
8 A. B. R. 69, the provability of a judgment for wilful
and malicious injury to the person was assumed, as was the
provability of a judgment obtained in an action for crim.
con. in In re Tinker, 3 A. B. R. 580,6 and of a judgment
secured for the alienation of a husband's affections in Leicester v. Hoadley, 9 A. B. R. 318.
The provability of claims, as was stated above, is determined as of the date of the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Without anticipating the discussion of the provability of unliquidated claims for personal torts, but assuming
for the present the conclusion that such claims are not
provable unless liquidated by judgment obtained before
bankruptcy, it is important to fix definitely the time when
such liquidation must have occurred, in order to admit of
their proof. Under the Act of 1867 that time was the date
of the adjudication. 7 All tort claims if reduced to judgment prior thereto were provable.8 Under the Act of 1898
the provability of claims is determined as of the date of
filing the petition. 9 If the claim is provable only when
reduced to judgment, judgment must have been entered
upon the claim before the petition is filed to admit the claim
to proof. A question has arisen under the present act, in
the case of such claims, whether the rendering of a verdict,
without the entry of judgment thereupon, before the filing
of the petition, will not entitle the plaintiff to prove in
bankruptcy. The general rule under other acts is well
settled that personal torts are provable only when reduced
to judgment prior to the proceedings in bankruptcy, and
the rendering of a verdict is not equivalent to the entry of
Further decisions on the provability of judgments for the same cause
of action are In re Sullivan, 2 A. B. R. 3o. and In re Freche, 6 A. B. R.
479.
'See also Tinker v. Colwell, Ii A. B. R. 568; decision of U. S.
Supreme Court.
"Act 1867, Section ig.
'In re Hennocksburgh & Block, 7 N. B. R. 37.
'In re Garlington,8 A. B. R. 6o2; 115 Fed. Rep. 999. In re Bingham,
2 A. B. R. 223; 94 Fed. Rep. 796.
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a judgment and will not authorize the proof of such a
claim.' 0 With all due deference to the opinion of the able
referee in In re Sullivan, 2 A. B. R. 3o , holding the contrary, the rule under the present act should be the same,
and verdicts rendered upon demands provable only when
reduced to judgment should not, without the entry of judgment upon the verdict prior to the filing of the petition,
convert the non-provable demand into a provable claim.
In In re Sullivan, supra, application was made in bankruptcy
for a stay upon a suit in a state court. The suit was one
by a father for the seduction of his daughter, and had
proceeded to trial and a verdict had been rendered without
the entry of judgment when the petition in bankruptcy was
filed. Under Section II of the Act of 1898 stays may be
granted only upon suits on claims released by the discharge
in bankruptcy. Under Section 17 no claims are released
by the discharge in bankruptcy unless they are provable.
The referee, Hotchkiss, first held that the verdict upon the
claim was tantamount to a judgment and was provable.
that such a judgment would be released by the discharge in
bankruptcy, and that the suit in the state court should be
stayed. By reason of the amendment to Section 17, excepting liabilities for seduction from discharge, the decision
in In re Sullivan is no longer good law. Indeed, even before
the amendments of 1903 there was respectable authority
holding, contrary to Referee Hotchkiss, that judgments
for seduction were not discharged."
It is, however, with
the position taken by the referee, that the entry of verdict
before the filing of the petition was equivalent to judgment
and sufficient liquidation of the damages to render the claim
provable, that exception is here taken.
The language of Section 63, a (I), is that debts are
provable which are "a fixed liability, as evidenced by a
judgment . . . , absolutely owing at the time of the filing
of the petition. . . ." There is no necessity, to entitle a

"0Bass v. Gilbert, 2 M. & S. 7o; Ex parte Brooke, 3 Ch. D. 494;
Hodges v. Chance, 2 Wend. 248; Kellogg v. Schuyler, 2 Denio, 73 ; Ziminer v. Schleehauf, 115 Mass. 52; Black v. McClelland, 12 N. B. R. 481.
'In re Freche, 6 A. B. R. 479.
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claim to be proved under that clause, that it be reduced to
judgment, if it be otherwise "a fixed liability . . . absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition." But
is a verdict such a liability? This question was squarely
raised in Black v. McClelland, 12 N. B. R. 481, where the
United States Circuit Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania held that the mere entry of a verdict created
no fixed liability. Its reasoning amply sustains that conclusion. "It"-i.e., a verdict--" is subject to the control
and discretion of the court, and may be superseded altogether by arresting judgment upon it, or by the allowance
of a new trial. No action could be maintained upon it; it
does not bear interest, and no determinate character is imposed upon it until the court has pronounced its judgment
that the plaintiff do recover from the defendant the amount
of it. The judgment establishes the indebtedness and impresses the obligation of payment, and so may be said to
create the debt. Not until it has passed is there a debt due
and payable." A judgment is conclusive evidence of a fixed
liability; a verdict is valid evidence of nothing. 12 It would
seem, therefore, that if the provability of a tort claim depends upon its reduction to judgment before the petition
is filed, the rendering of a verdict without the entry of
judgment thereupon before that time will not entitle the
claim to be admitted to proof.
Judgments in tort actions should not be confounded with
fines inflicted by the court as a punishment for crime in
criminal actions against the bankrupt. Such fines are not
provable. Though within the letter of Section 63, a (I),
as being fixed liabilities evidenced by a judgment, they are
not within the spirit or intent of the act, and their exclusion from proof in bankruptcy is based upon public policy
and sound reasoning. 13 If provable, the act does not pro" Black: Judgments (2d Ed.), Sections 6og and 682, and cases there

cited.

"In In re Moore, 6 A. B. R- 590; 115 Fed. Rep. 145, the district judge,
Evans, said: "In my opinion it was never intended in this indirect way
(in derogation of the exclusive right of the chief executive to pardon
offenders or to remit fines imposed upon them) to relieve criminals
from penalties incurred for criminal acts. It seems to me that to rule
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vide for their exception from release by discharge in bankruptcy; and it cannot be pretended that bankruptcy proceedings were designed for the relief of criminals. There
is sufficient reason for admitting judgments in tort actions
to proof in the fact that the persons wronged were entitled by
virtue of their judgment to proceed upon civil process to
exact satisfaction out of the estate of the bankrupt had
bankruptcy not occurred; and, indeed, when provision is
made by law for the collection, by civil process, of fines
or penalties imposed as a punishment for crime, claims for4
such fines and penalties may be provable in bankruptcy.1
But for the same reason that pardon from the punishment
for crime should not be obtainable by proceedings in bankruptcy, so too public policy dictates that the penalties imposed for heinous private wrongs in the civil court by way
of damages in actions ex delicto be not excused or remitted
by the discharge in bankruptcy, although the judgment be
admitted to proof; hence the provisions in the various statutes exempting such liabilities from release by a discharge
in bankruptcy.
IIl.

PROOF OF TORT CLAIMS NOT REDUCED TO JUDGMENT.

Observing the classification made above of unliquidated
tort claims as arising from either torts which result in the
enrichment of the tort-feasor or torts which, not so resulting, are merely personal, the discussion of the proof of
otherwise would make the bankrupt court the .means of frustrating
proper efforts to enforce criminal statutes enacted for the public welfare. Congress, in my opinion, never so contemplated or intended....
The provisions of the Bankrupt Act have reference alone to civil liabilities as demands between debtor and creditor as such, and not to
punishments inflicted pro bono publico for crimes committed." In In
re Alderson, 3 A. B. R. 544; 98 Fed. Rep. 588, the court permitted
proof to be made upon a fine inflicted as a punishment for crime; but
the better view is that of In re Moore, supra. The cases under earlier
acts support the latter decision; under the Act of i841, People v.
Spalding, io Paige, 284, affirmed by New York Court of Errors in 7
Hill, 301, affirmed by United States Supreme Court in 4 How. 2r;
under the Act of 1867, In re Sutherland, 3 N. B. R. 314. Adjudications
under the Act of 1898 in accord with In re Moore may be found in the
notes
in r Natl. Bankr. News, 48 and 59.
"4 In re Rosey, 8 N. B. R. 5o9; Barnes v. U. S., 12 N. B. R. 526.
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unliquidated torts may be profitably divided in accordance
with that classification; and since there is authority for
holding the former class provable under Section 63, a (4),
of the present act of Congress, and the latter class of personal torts provable under Section 63, b, their admission
to proof will be considered in conjunction with those clauses
of the act.
A. Proof of UnliquidatedClaims for Torts which Enriched
the Tort-Feasor. Act of 1898, Section 63, a (4).
In Section 19 of the Act of 1867 it was provided, inter
alia, as follows:
"All demands against the bankrupt for and on
account of any goods or chattels wrongfully taken,
converted, or withheld by him may be proved and
allowed as debts to the amount of the value of the
property so taken or withheld, with interest."
The section also provided for the assessment of damages
upon such demands, when unliquidated, and for proof
when and as assessed. Under this section proof could be
made in all cases where the bankrupt had obtained the property of another wrongfully and had thereby unjustly enriched himself at the expense of the claimant. The incorporation of some such provision in every bankruptcy statute is necessary if the statute is satisfactorily to attain its
purpose-viz., furnish remedies commensurate with the
necessities and demands of the business world. Trade in
merchandise and the exchange of property and goods is,
in the main, conducted through the medium of contracts,
express or implied in fact. The right to prove upon all such
contracts, therefore, is a complete remedy in the great majority of commercial transactions. But business conditions
are such that frequently no contract exists as a basis for
proof in bankruptcy. Liabilities arise ex delicto and not
ex contractu as well within as without the operations of
trade and commerce; and the business world, not distinguishing, as the law does, between causes of action based
upon torts and those based upon contracts, demands the
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right to prove upon claims arising from all commercial
transactions whether they create a cause of action contractual or delictual in law. The right to prove should, therefore, exist in all those numerous cases where through fraud
and trickery, and without a contract of sale being made, the
bankrupt has obtained the goods or property of another,
and where by false representations and fraud contracts of
sale are made, but rescinded without the return or recovery
of any or all the goods sold. Such transactions are incident to the conduct of business. No contract exists upon
which a claim can be made in bankruptcy. The claims are
tort claims, but from their commercial character they come
properly within the scope of a bankruptcy statute; and, as
a commercial law, it should distinguish in the admission of
claims to proof in favor of such claims as opposed to those
purely personal torts of which a measure designed to relieve
commercial conditions need take no cognizance. The
framers of the Act of 1867 apparently recognized these
principles. At all events they made abundant provision
for the proof of claims arising from the unjust enrichment
of the bankrupt by his wrongfully taking, withholding, or
converting another's property.
Are the provisions of the Act of 1898 adequate to meet
and satisfy commercial conditions, so as to admit to proof
claims for torts that result in the unjust enrichment of the
tort-feasor? Several District Courts have declared the act
to warrant the proof of such claims, and have construedSection 63, a (4), which provides for the proof of debts
"founded

. .

. upon a contract express or implied," as

authorizing the proof not only of contracts express or implied in fact, but also of contracts implied in law,-the
so-called quasi-contracts, which are contracts in name only,
and that merely in right of the form of remedy, but in substance and origin are delictual. When the tort results in
the unjust enrichment of the tort-feasor, these cases hold
that the tort may be waived and a claim may be proved
based upon a contract said to be implied in law to reimburse
the owner for his property, with which the bankrupt has
unjustly enriched himself.
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Upon familiar principles in the law of " quasi-contracts"
the right to waive a tort and recover in assumpsit-is one
conferred by law irrespective of the intention of the parties. No real contract based upon the assent of the parties, either express or implied in fact, exists in such cases.
The obligation thus sought to be enforced in an action of
assumpsit is one imposed by law, and does not arise from
the mutual agreement of contracting parties. The adequacy
of the provisions of the Act of 1898 to admit of the proof
of unliquidated tort claims based upon the unjust enrichment of the bankrupt at the expense of the claimant therefore depends upon the construction of Section 63, a (4).
Do the terms "contract express or implied" contemplate
only contracts in fact, the obligation whereof is created by
the parties themselves, or are they broad enough to include
as well "contracts implied in law," which are not contracts
at all, but whose obligation is created by law and enforced
in an action contractual in form?
The leading case in support of the liberal construction
of this clause is In re Hirschman, 4 A. B. R. 715; 104
Fed. Rep. 69. The question there arose upon a petition
for the liquidation of claims against the bankrupt. The
bankrupt had been a retail dealer in boots and shoes. The
petitioners alleged that he had made purchases from them
upon fraudulent representations. They elected to rescind
the sales and prayed for the recovery in specie of the shoes
not sold by the bankrupt which were in possession of the
trustee, and claimed the right to prove for the proceeds of
the shoes which the bankrupt had sold, and prayed that this
claim might be liquidated under- the direction of the court.
Upon the subject of the provability of the claim for the
proceeds of the shoes converted, the court, after ruling that
the petitioners must bring themselves within Section 63,
subsection "a," in order to prove their debt, said: " Section 63, subsection 'a,' does not authorize the proof of
any claim arising ex delicto, unless a recovery may be had
quasi ex contractu. Under subsection 4, claims founded
upon a contract, express or implied, may be proved. The
implied contract intended includes the fictitious contract
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implied in law-only treated as a contract for the sake of
the remedy-and the true contract implied in fact. As 'the
petitioners rescinded the several contracts of sale, the goods
must be considered as tortiously acquired by the bankrupt,
except as against a purchaser without notice. If the goods
were sold by the bankrupt, the petitioners can treat the
sales as made for them, and maintain a claim for the consideration obtained by the bankrupt as money had and received to their several use. This is said to be waiving the
tort and suing in contract. In truth, it is but an election of
remedy, as the tort is not waived, but insisted on as the
basis for the rescission of the contract." Leave was then
given for the filing of the claims, for their liquidation and
subsequent proof. The facts of this case render it typical
of the class of cases wherein the tort has led to the unjust
enrichment of the bankrupt. The contract of sale was
rescinded. There was, therefore, no substantive consentual
contract as a basis for proof. An action, however, could
be framed in assumpsit, as for money had and received, to
recover the proceeds of the goods, and the court held that
the purely procedural contract in such an action was as
well within the phrase "contract express or implied" as
were the substantive consentual contracts.
In re Hirschman was the decision of the District Court
of Utah. The District Court for the Southern District of
New York reached the same conclusion in In re Filer, 5
A. B. R. 834, affirming the ruling of the referee in the same
case, 5 A. B. R. 582. In that case some of the claims of
the petitioners were for money obtained from the petitioners
by the bankrupt, in part upon indorsements forged by him,
and in part by his abstracting it from their cash-drawer and
concealing the withdrawals by false entries in the books.
Obviously such claims are purely tortious. There never
was a contract between the petitioners, Kohn & Co., and
the bankrupt with respect to these sums of money. Following In re Hirschman, supra, the referee admitted the
claims to proof, saying: "The objection that the debts
due Kohn & Co. are not provable in bankruptcy must
be overruled. The several debts are susceptible of two

488

THE PROVABILITY OF TORT CLAIMS IN

BANKRUPTCY.

constructions. They may be treated as a contract in law,
or as claims based upon a tort. It is well settled that
where a claim arises ex delicto, but is also of such a character as to constitute a claim on the theory of quasi-contract, the debt is provable in bankruptcy. The creditor has
the election to waive the tort and sue in contract. In re
Hirschman, 4 Am. B. R. 715; In re Lazarovic, I Am. B. R.
476.15 I can add nothing to the well-considered opinion
in It re Hirschman." The same rule is reiterated by the
referee in In re Wigmore, IO A. B. R. 661, the latest judicial utterance found upon the question.
These cases clearly decide that where the bankrupt has
unjustly enriched himself at the expense of a claimant, and
the latter might have proceeded at law had bankruptcy not
intervened and procured redress in an action of assumpsit
for money had and received, waiving his right to sue in
an action ex delicto, he may prove in bankruptcy in virtue
of his possessing a right of action contractual in form. No
question can be raised as to the propriety of the principle
that seems to have guided the courts in reaching their decisions. A bankruptcy statute should admit of the proof
of claims for torts which result in the enrichment of the
bankrupt. But unless warranted by a proper construction
of the statute, the rule established by those cases is but
judicial legislation in relief of a defective statute which
may be effectually vetoed when the question reaches the
Supreme Court. The clause of the Act of 1867 above
quoted 16 was a wise provision under which claims for torts
enriching the bankrupt were provable. Some similar provision should be incorporated by amendment in Section 63
"In re Hirschman undoubtedly sustains the view of the referee in
In re Filer; but it is difficult to see how he can derive any support
from In re Lazarovic. In that case the proof of claim was for goods

procured by the bankrupt from the claimants by purchases induced by
his fraudulent representations. The referee treated the claim as one for
goods sold and delivered, refusing to consider the question of fraud.
The claim was allowed as for a debt upon an express contract between
the parties. Only if the contract had been rescinded for fraud, and
there was no allegation in the proof of claim of such rescission, would
opportunity have been afforded for the application of quasi-contractual
principles.
"At page 484.
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of the present act if the Supreme Court should hold, contrary to In re Hirschman,that the phrase "contract express
or implied" refers only to substantive contracts and not to
the procedural contracts in tort claims that may be prosecuted in action by a suit in assumpsit. So far as the decided cases go our present statute is adequate to the purpose; but since a doubt as to the provability of these
"quasi-contractual" claims under the act has been raised
by some authorities, 17 it may not be altogether amiss to
state some of the reasons that might be urged for holding
that such claims are not properly provable.
In England claims are provable which are based upon
torts which, in the choice of a remedy, may be waived and
upon which an action of assumpsit for money had and
received would lie.'
Recovery in such cases is for a sum
certain. They are therefore not within the inhibition of
the English statutes 19 upon the proof of demands for unliquidated damages, and are within the terms of those
statutes for the proof, save as to certain exceptions, of
"all debts or liabilities . . . to which the debtor is subject. ..

."

This phraseology is evidently of broader sig-

nification than is that of Section 63, a (4), of our present
statute. The term "liabilities" includes claims not included in the term "contracts."
Under the Act of 1867
there was no question as to the provability of demands
against the bankrupt on account of goods wrongfully
taken, withheld, or converted by him, by reason of the
statutory provision admitting such claims to proof, but
except in such cases as were within that provision of the
statute unliquidated tort claims could not be proved, although upon them an action might have been brought in
assumpsit as for money had and received. The English
rule in favor of the proof of quasi-contract claims upon
torts, as enunciated in Watson v. Holliday, L. R. 20, Ch.
1T

Lowell: "A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy" (1899), pages
436 and 487.
Watson v. Holliday, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 78o (i881).
Ex parte Adamson, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 807 (1878).
'English Bankruptcy Act of 186 , Section 31 ;-English Bankruptcy
Act of 1883, Section 37.
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Div. 780, was expressly disapproved in it re Boston and
FairhavenIron Works, 23 Fed. Rep. 88o, the facts of both
cases being the same and raising the question of the provability of a claim for the profits accruing from the infringement
of a patent right. There is, therefore, nothing in either the
English or the earlier American bankruptcy law that throws
light upon the question of the provability, as quasi-contracts, of claims for torts resulting in the unjust enrichment of the bankrupt under a statute like that of 1898
admitting the proof of "contracts express or implied." We
are left in the construction of those words to such guidance
as is afforded by the construction of similar words in other
statutes, or by an independent construction of the words
in the Act of 1898.
Keener, in his work on Quasi-Contracts, 20 points out that
the terminology of the law that gives the name "implied
contracts" or " quasi-contracts" to obligations imposed by
law, in the absence of any agreement of the parties, which
are enforced through the medium of an assumpsit action,
has rendered difficult the construction and interpretation of
statutes employing the word "contract," or the phrase
"contracts express or implied." By the use of those terms
does the legislature intend to include with the substantive,
consentual contracts the obligations known as " quasi-contracts," obligations the law imposes without or in opposition
to the consent of the parties, which are not contractual in
essence though enforceable through the procedure invoked
to enforce substantive contracts? The usual construction
is that the words denote only consentual, and not procedural
or "quasi" contracts. Perhaps the leading case is Dusenbury v. Speir, 77 N. Y. 144, wherein the legality of an
arrest turned upon the meaning to be given to the phrase
"contract express or implied," as used in a statute regulating arrests in civil actions. The plaintiff had been arrested in an action, corresponding to the common law action,
for money had and received, brought to recover money
fraudulently obtained by him, upon the theory that the
"0Page ii et seq.
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action was that of contract express or implied within the
meaning of the statute. It was held that his liability was
in quasi-contract, and not in contract, and that as the
phrase "contract express or implied" was used in the statute with reference solely to genuine contracts, the arrest
was illegal. 2 1 In O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428, the same
court said that the term "contract" used in a statute reducing the rate of interest applied only to genuine contracts based upon the agreement of the parties, and did
not include quasi-contracts. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, in Inhabitants of Milford v. Massachusetts, 144 Mass. 64, held that, under a statute giving it
jurisdiction of claims against the commonwealth based upon
contracts for the payment of money, it could take cognizance only of actual contracts arising from the consent or
agreement of the parties, and that it had no jurisdiction of
claims based upon obligations arising ex lege which are
enforced as if they arose ex contractu. In Pennsylvania
the same conclusion was reached as to the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace under a statute 22 giving those officials jurisdiction "of all causes of action arising from
contract, either express or implied," etc. Judge Gibson
"This statement of the facts of the case is taken from Keener:
Quasi-Contracts, page 12. In the course of his opinion in the case Mr.
Justice Danforth said: ".

.

. We think that the express contract re-

ferred to in the statute is one which has been entered into by the
parties, and upon which, if broken, an action will lie for damages, or
is implied, when the intention of the parties, if not expressed in words,
may be gathered from their acts and from surrounding circumstances;
and in either case must be the result of the free 4nd bona-fide exercise
of the will, producing the aggregatio inentium, the joining together of
two minds, essential to a contract at common law. There is a class of
cases where the law prescribes the rights and liabilities of persons who
have not in reality entered into any contract at all with one another
but between whom circumstances have arisen which make it just that
one should have a right, and the other should be subject to a liability,
similar to the rights and liabilities in certain cases of express contract.
Thus if one man has obtained money from another through the medium
of oppression, imposition, extortion, or deceit, or by the commission
of a trespass, such money may be recovered back, for the law implies
a promise from the wrong-doer to restore it to the rightful owner,
although it is obvious that it is the very opposite of his intention. Implied or constructive contracts of this nature are similar to the constructive trusts of courts of equity, and in fact are not contracts at all."
'Act

March 20, 181o; 5 Sm. L. 161, Sect. i.
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said: "The 'causes of action arising from contract, either
express or implied,' which appertain to the jurisdiction of
a justice of the peace, are those which arise from the agreement or understanding immediately between the parties.
It is evident, therefore, that it is not the form of the action,
but the nature of the subject-matter of it, which must decide
the question of jurisdiction." 23
The decisions of the state courts construing statutes in
which occur the words "contracts express or implied" sustain the view that those terms include and relate only to
consentual or genuine contracts and not the merely procedural quasi-contracts. Of peculiar significance would be
decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing
that expression; but in the cases in which the construction
of a statute using those terms was before that court the
statute was that of a state and not an act of Congress.
Following the well-established rule, the United States Supreme Court adopted the construction placed upon the state
statute by the highest judicial body of the state, and in
Morley v. Lake Shore Ry Co., 146 U. S. 162, the construction of the term "contract" in a New York statute
was determined by the decision in O'Brien v. Young,

4

above

quoted, as including only consentual or substantive contracts.2 5r The word "contract" does, however, appear in
the Federal Constitution in the clause prohibiting states
from passing laws impairing the obligation of "contracts;"
and the decisions of all courts are uniform in restricting,
the prohibition to cases involving true contracts based upon
the assent of the parties, and in excluding from its operation laws that impair obligations in quasi-contracts, arising
ex lege independently of the agreement of the parties. In
Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans, 1O9 U. S. 285, Mr.

Justice Field said: "The term 'contract'

is used in the

' Schaffer et al. v. McNamee, 13 S. & R. 44 To the same effect are
Ziegler v. Gram, 13 S. & R. 102; Zell v. Arnold, 2 P. & W. 292; and
Seitzinger v. Sternberger, 12 Pa. 379.
"95 N. Y. 428.
See also Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McFadden, lO5 Fed. Rep. 293;

affirmed in 185 U. S. 505.
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constitution in its ordinary sense, as signifying the agreement of two or more minds, for considerations proceeding
from one to the other, to do, or not to do, certain acts.
Mutual assent to its terms is of its very essence. .

. The

prohibition of the Federal Constitution was intended to
secure the observance of good faith in the stipulation of
parties against state action. Where a transaction is not
based upon any assent of parties, it cannot be said that
any faith is pledged with respect to it, and no case arises
for the operation of the prohibition." 26 Chief Justice Bermudez, in State v. City of New Orleans, 38 La. Ann. 119,27
said: "No principle is better recognized by law or jurisprudence than that he who receives what is not due to him,
whether he receives it through error or knowingly, obliges
himself to restore it to him from whom he unduly received
it, and that he who has thus paid through his mistake,
believing himself a debtor, may reclaim what he has paid.
. . . It does not, however, follow that the right to claim
reimbursement and the obligation to refund arise from a
contract, express or implied, which is protected from impairment or invasion by the Constitution of the United
States. . .

."

Statutes changing the obligations imposed

by law independently of the stipulations of the parties, he
held, were not within the prohibition of the constitution.
The phraseology and intent of the Federal Constitution
are such that the decisions construing the term "contracts"
in the constitution may not be conclusive or even persuasive of the construction of Section 63, a (4), of the Bankruptcy Statute. It is difficult, however; to distinguish the
terms of that statute from the similar terms of the state
statutes above referred to, or to suggest any other reason
why their construction should not be the same than that
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are to be liberally
construed, and that, in the liberal construction of its phrases,
the courts, as in fact they do, may ignore the construction
' See also Chase v. Curtis, 113 U. S. 452; Morley v. Lake Shore Ry.
Co., 146 U. S. 162; Evans-Suider-Buel Co. v. McFadden, 105 Fed. Rep.
293; affirmed 185 U. S. 5o5.

58 Am. Rep. I68.
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of identical phrases in other acts. It is contrary to the prevailing rule in other cases, but, so far as the cases decided
in the District Courts can establish the principle, settled
under the Bankruptcy Act, that torts enriching the tortfeasor, which may be sued out in actions contractual in form,
are provable as being "contracts implied" within the meaning of the statute. In re Hirschman and In re Filer, supporting that view and discussed above, have been expressly
disapproved in none of the decisions, and unless the Supreme Court, adhering to the stricter construction of Dusenbury v. Speir, and the cases like it, overrules In re Hirschman, the proof of unliquidated claims for torts which enriched the bankrupt under the act will be limited only by
the limitations imposed by the law of quasi-contracts. In
but one decision, In re Cushing, 6 A. B. R. 22, and that
subject to criticism from other points of view, was the right
of proof denied under Section 63, a (4), of a tort claim on
which a quasi-contractual remedy lay.
If the rule of In re Hirschman is to prevail, and unliquidated tort claims are to be provable, provided the tort enriched the tort-feasor and an action in contract may be
framed upon the claim, then the extent of this right of
proof will vary among the states according as the right to
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit is broad or narrow in
the several jurisdictions. Where the bankrupt has converted and sold the claimant's property or where the bankrupt has wrongfully obtained possession of money belonging
to another, the tort may universally be waived and an action
28
brought in assumpsit as for money had and received.
Where, however, the goods wrongfully taken or withheld
' The decisions are collected in Keener on Quasi-Contracts, page 17o.
See also i5 A. & E. Encyc. (2d Ed.), page 1113. This rule obtains
even in states wherein, as stated below, a tort may not be waived and
an action of assumpsit brought as for goods sold and delivered where
the goods wrongfully taken are retained in specie and not converted,
and an action of assumpsit as for money had and received would not
lie: Mass., Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 124; Ala., Thornton v. Strauss,
79 Ala. 164; Ark., Hudson v. Gilliland, 25 Ark. IOO; Mo., Dougherty
v. Chapman, 29 Mo. App. 233; Vt., Stearns v. Dillingham, 22 Vt. 624;
Penna., Willet v. Willet, 3 Watts, 277; Boro' v. Fire Ins. Co., 81 Pa.
445; Satterlee v. Mellick, 76 Pa. 62.
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are retained in specie and not converted, in which case an
action of assumpsit for money had and received would not
lie, the right to prove as upon an assumpsit count for goods
sold and delivered exists in some states but not in others.
In many instances this question may be avoided by the claimant's proceeding, not as a creditor seeking to prove a claim,
but as the owner of property in the possession of the bankrupt or his trustee, for whose recovery in specie he may
petition the court. Reclamation proceedings of this character are preferable to the right to prove as a general creditor
for obvious reasons. They afford a complete remedy, restoring the petitioner to the position he occupied before the
commission of the tort. Regaining his property in specie,
he suffers no abatement of his claim as do general creditors
in the distribution of the assets of the estate. 20 The right
to reclaim property in the possession of the trustee is, however, subject to abuse. It is always a proper remedy where
the bankrupt obtained the goods tortiously and without any
contract of sale having been made. In such case title to
the property never vested in the bankrupt. But where the
goods are obtained under a contract of sale upon fraudulent
representations, the propriety of the remedy is not so clear.
Title has actually passed to the bankrupt, and though an
equity resides in the vendor to rescind the sale for fraud,
to permit him to exercise this right after bankruptcy intervenes enables him practically to work a preference for
himself. It gives to such a vendor a right not possessed by
other creditors. He can rely upon the contract of sale so
long as it is to his interest so to do, and when, upon the
adjudication in bankruptcy, his interest is to terminate the
contract, he is privileged to do so and permitted to reclaim
as his own what, but for bankruptcy, he would have treated
as the bankrupt's property. The right to rescind sales for
fraud might well be limited to the period prior to the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy. The present state of the law
encourages vendor-creditors to cry "fraud" whenever their
' Such proceedings were had in In re Hirschman, 4 A. B. R. 715;

In re Weil, 7 A. B. R. go; Coleman v. Sherman. 8 A. B. R. 763.
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vendee becomes a bankrupt, and reclamation proceedings
would denude the estate of a trader of its assets if the courts
did not restrict their operation to only clear and indisputable cases. The trend of the authorities is to narrow the
scope of such proceedings. 30 The diversity of the authorities
upon the right to sue in assumpsit for goods tortiously
taken or withheld and retained in specie and not sold, is
important only if reclamation proceedings may not be had.
Only if the claimant cannot recover his property in specie,
is it of consequence whether or not he can prove for its value
as upon a contract. In some states the tort may be waived
and action brought in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered; in other states the fictional contract adopted for the
sake of the remedy is confined to the assumpsit count of
money had and received and the tort remedy may not be
waived in favor of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered.3 1 In the early cases in which effect was given to the
rule embodied in the maxim, " neno debet locupletari ex
alterius incommodo," the unjust enrichment resulted in the
tort-feasor's coming into the possession of money which
ex equo et bono he should have refunded to the person
wronged. An action for money had and received would
lie in such case.3 2 There was, however, no common law
action ex contractu that afforded a remedy in cases of unjust
enrichment where the count for money had and received
would not lie. Hence the remedies were not sufficient to
give complete effect to the maxim quoted in actions of assumpsit. Where the unjust enrichment resulted in the acquisition and retention by the tort-feasor of personal property,
there was no contractual remedy at common law, and in the
"In re O'Connor, 7 A. B. R. 428. In re Murphy-Barbee Shoe Co., ii
A. B. R. 428.
In California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin the tort may be waived, and assumpsit brought
for goods sold and delivered. The contrary rule prevails in Alabama,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Vermont. See Keener on Quasi-Contracts, pages 193, 194; 15 A. & E.
Encycl. of Law (2d Ed.), page 1116, where the decisions are collected.
'Lamine v. Dorrell, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1216.
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states which adhere to the principles of the common law
the tort may not, in such cases, be waived in favor of an
assumpsit action. In the other jurisdictions an action of
be brought, alassumpsit for goods sold and delivered may
33
though no contract of sale exists in fact.

Under the Act of 1867 proof could be made upon unliquidated claims for torts arising from the unjust acquisition
of another's goods, whether the goods were retained in
specie or converted into money. Even if the rule of ln re
Hirschman prevails, and proof may be made under the Act
of 1898 for torts which are the subject of a contractual
remedy, the right to prove will vary with the states according to the existence or non-existence of the right to waive
the tort and sue in assumpsit when the goods tortiously
obtained are retained in specie, and not converted. And when
it is recalled that there is no inconsiderable authority that
may sway the Supreme Court to deny the right under Section 63, a (4), to prove any but substantive contracts, and
thus hold that unliquidated claims for torts resulting in the
unjust enrichment of the bankrupt are not provable, it will
be seen that our present statute is defective where the Act
of 1867 was adequate in affording a right of proof properly
desired by the business community.
'The leading cases expressive of these two views are Jones v. Hoar,
5 Pick. 285, wherein the court declares that an action for goods sold and
delivered lies only when a contract of sale exists in fact; and Terry v.
Munger, 121 N. Y. 161, wherein the court took the position that if an
assumpsit count lies to recover money unjustly obtained, there was no
reason why an assumpsit count as for goods sold and delivered should
not lie to recover goods unjustly obtained. In Pennsylvania where the
goods wrongfully taken are retained in specie, no contract of sale can
be sued on, as a basis for recovery of their value, unless there be a
contract express or implied in fact. Willett v. Willett, 3 Watts, 277;
Satterlee v. Mellick, 76 Pa. 62; Boro' v. Fire Ins. Co., 81 Pa. 445;
Boyer v. Bullard, 102 Pa. 555. In such cases the tort may not be
waived. Where, however, the goods wrongfully taken are consumed, an
action in assumpsit, as for goods sold and delivered, will lie. Philada.
Co. v. Parks Bros., 138 Pa. 346; see also Satterlee v. Mellick, supra.
There are dicta to the effect that such an assumpsit action might lie
and the tort be waived where there was any fraud or unfair dealing in
the taking. Deysher v. Triebel, 64 Pa. 383; Satterlee v. Mellick, supra;
Boro' v. Ins. Co., supra.
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B. Proof of Unliquidated Claims for Personal Torts. Act
x898, Section 63, b.
The rule under the English and earlier American statutes
is that unliquidated claims for personal torts are not provable. The opinion of the court in an English case has already
been referred to as expressive of the English rule.3 4 Under
our former Bankruptcy Acts unliquidated claims for torts,
except for the taking, withholding, or conversion of goods
under the Act of 1867, were not provable. Unliquidated
claims for personal torts were, therefore, not provable.3 5
Section 63, b, of our present act provides as follows:
"Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt may,
pursuant to application to the court, be liquidated
in such manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and allowed against his estate."
The editor of the fourth edition of Collier on Bankruptcy,
Referee Hotchkiss, in discussing this section of the act inclines to the opinion that by reason of subsection b all unliquidated tort claims of whatever nature are provable, and
in support of this opinion he cites In re Cushing, 6 A. B. R.
22, and In re Lazarovic, I A. B. R. 476. Such a rule would
be an innovation in bankruptcy law. The general rule both
in England and under our former acts of Congress is against
the provability of such claims. If Collier's be the correct
view, however, then it is immaterial whether or not, as discussed above, under Section 63, a (4), torts may be proved
provided an assumpsit action may be used in the choice of a
remedy thereupon; for according to the text of Collier subsection b provides for the proof of unliquidated demands
both for torts that enriched the tort-feasor and for merely
personal torts.
There is nothing in In re Lazarovic to sustain Collier.
It was a case wherein a claimant sought and was permitted
" James, L. J., in Ex parte Llynvi Coal and Iron Co., L. R. 7 Ch. App.
28; and page 475 ante.
Kellogg v. Schuyler, 2 Denio, 73; In re Hennocksburgh, 7 N. B. R.
37; Black v. McClelland, 12 N. B. R. 481; In re Schiuhardt, 15 N. B.

R. 161.
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to prove for the balance due upon goods sold upon credit.
In his proof of claim he averred that the sale and extension
of credit were secured through fraud and false representations. The referee refused to consider the allegations of
fraud. Nor was any rescission of the contract of sale alleged. The proof was therefore upon the original contract
and the case does not even suggest the meaning of subsection b.
In In re Cushing a claim was presented for the value of
goods whose sale to the bankrupt was alleged to have been
induced by false representations. The referee, Moss, seemed
to distinguish between torts of a personal character and
torts enriching the tort-feasor. Of the former class he said:
"It may be that the language of paragraph b is broad
enough, as has been suggested by Collier in notes to this
section in his valuable work on bankruptcy, to include claims
for damages for such personal wrongs as assault or slander." But he refused to express an opinion thereupon. The
case before him was of the other class of torts. Under In
re Hirschman proof might have been made under Section
63, a (4); but the referee held that the claim was not
provable under subsection a, but might have been proved
under subsection b had application for its liquidation first
been made. For default thereof the claim was disallowed.
This case goes no farther than to hold that where the tort
enriches the bankrupt the claim is provable under paragraph b of Section 63. It illustrates the tendency of the
courts to seek an avenue through which to admit to proof
torts of that character, and for that purpose alone it holds
that paragraph b defines a new class of provable debts. It
is authority for nothing as to personal torts. 36 A carelessly
added dictum in Beers v. Hanlin, 3 A. B. R. 745, is the only
authority to support the view that under paragraph b unliquidated claims for personal torts may be proved.
The question raised by Collier and the cases just mentioned, briefly stated, is whether paragraph b of Section 63
"it
re Morales, 5 A. B. R. 425, bears some resemblance to In re
Cushing.
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states a class of provable debts, under which unliquidated
tort claims may be proved, additional to the classes of provable debts defined in Section 63, a; or whether paragraph b
merely provides for the liquidation of unliquidated claims
provable under paragraph a. Does paragraph b add to the
number of provable debts defined in paragraph a? If it does,
all claims for torts are provable. If it does not, unliquidated
claims for personal torts are not provable, and similar claims
for torts enriching the tort-feasor are provable, if at all,
only under Section 63, a (4).
The view last expressed is undoubtedly correct. Its first
clear expression was given in ln re Hirschman.3 7 Judge
Marshall there said: "For the petitioners it is contended
that Section 63, subsection 'b,' of the Bankrupt Act of
1898 authorizes the liquidation and subsequent proof of
claims ex delicto. Except as to causes of action which, at
the option of the claimant, permit a recovery in quasi-contract or in tort, I am unable to accede to this proposition.
. . . The intent of Congress was to specify in subsection
Ca' all provable debts, and in subsection 'b' to provide
for the liquidation of such as, falling under subsection 'a,'
were yet unliquidated."
Inasmuch as the court held the
claim provable under Section 63, a (4), it might be urged
that its statements as to paragraph b were merely obiter,
and not persuasive as to the construction of that paragraph
when purely personal torts come before the court for admission to proof under paragraph b.
Such personal torts were under consideration in In re
Yates, 8 A. B. R. 69.38 The provability of an unliquidated
claim for a wilful and malicious injury to the person of the
petitioning creditor was there discussed. Referring to subdivision b of Section 63, the court, citing In re Hirschman,
said: "This subdivision is not to be construed as authorizing the proof of claims not declared in subdivision 'a' to
be provable. Its object is simply to provide that unliquidated claims which fall within the scope of subdivision ' a'
'See
'See

page 486, ante, for facts.
also In re Brinckmann, 4 A. B. R. 551.
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are to be liquidated in such manner as the court shall direct."
The claim was held not to be provable, and the petition was
dismissed. In it re Wigmore & Sons Co., IO A. B. R.
661, the court denied the right to prove for damages for
negligence resulting in the injury of the claimant. In the
course of his scholarly opinion the referee, Helm, said: "It
is conceded, following the decision in In re Hirschman, 4
Am. B. R. 715, io4 Fed. 69, that subsection b of Section
63 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provides for the
liquidation by the court of unliquidated claims against the
bankrupt and that they may thereafter be proved against the
estate, covers only such claims as when liquidated are provable debts under the classification of the preceding subsection
a, and does not authorize the liquidation and proof of claims
arising ex delicto, unless they are of such a nature that the
claimant might at his election waive the tort and recover
in quasi-contract." A similar view of the law is taken in
the cases cited in the notes. 39 They were not cases involving
the right to prove for personal torts, as were the foregoing
cases, but their statement of the law is in accord with the
quotations just made.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has expressed
its opinion upon the subject. The question was raised in
Dunbar v. Dunbar, io A. B. R. 140, 190 U. S. 340, a case
involving the provability of a contractual liability for the
support of wife and children. The provability of claims for
personal torts was not before the court, but there is no reason
to believe that the statement of Mr. Justice Peckham will
not represent the views of the court when a tort claim is
before it. He said :4 " In Section 63, b, provision is made
for unliquidated claims against the bankrupt, which may
be liquidated upon application to the court in such manner
as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and allowed
against his estate. This paragraph b, however, adds nothing to the class of debts which might be proved under para" In re Marcus, 5 A. B. R. xg. In re Big Meadows Gas Co., 7 A. B.

R. 697.
40 o A.

B. R.

i4g; 190 U. S. 350.
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graph a of the same section. Its purpose is to permit an
unliquidated claim, coming within the provisions of Section
63, a, to be liquidated as the court should direct."
Paragraph b of Section 63 therefore does not specify a
class of provable debts additional to those stated in paragraph a. It merely provides for the liquidation and proof
of such unliquidated claims as are provable under paragraph
a. Claims for personal torts not reduced to judgment are
not provable under paragraph a. They are, therefore, not
provable. Only when the tort enriched the bankrupt is an
unliquidated tort claim provable under the Act of 1898;
and that, under the decisions of the District Courts, is because upon such a claim an action in quasi-contract would
lie which would render the claim provable under Section
63, a (4).
To summarize the results of this discussion it may be said
that under the Act of 1898 tort claims reduced to judgment
before the filing of the petition are provable. The rendition
of a verdict prior to that time is not sufficient liquidation of
such claims to render them provable as liquidated claims
under Section 63, a (I). Tort claims unliquidated when
the petition is filed are not provable if they arise from personal- torts. When based upon wrongs which enriched the
bankrupt the decided cases hold that unliquidated tort claims
may be proved under Section 63, a (4), if the claimant can
waive his remedy ex delicto and sue in quasi-contract. This
last right is not conceded without a reservation as to its
validity. It is urged that it is created only by a forced and
strained construction of the act, by giving to the expression
"implied contract" a meaning accorded it in no other statute. Even if this construction be correct, the remedy afforded is scarcely adequate to the relief desired. The right
to prove should exist whenever the bankrupt's estate has
been enriched by the unjust acquisition or conversion of the
claimant's property; but under the most liberal construction
of the Act of 1898 the right to prove in such cases exists
only when an assumpsit action can be brought upon the
tort.
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In reaching these conclusions attention has been centred
upon Section 63 of the act to the exclusion of all other sections, and, in particular, Section 17. The latter section
specifies the debts not affected by a discharge in bankruptcy.
None but provable debts are discharged, and of the provable
debts all are discharged except those specifically exempted.
By reason of the phraseology of Clause 2, as amended in
i903, exempting from discharge "liabilities" for several
stated classes of torts, it has been argued that unliquidated
demands for these torts are provable. 4 1 It is true that the
term "liabilities" includes liabilities arising from unliquidated as well as from liquidated demands, but as used in
Section 17, a (2), the word must be held to relate only to

"provable" liabilities. Provable liabilities are defined in
Section 63, and its provisions cannot properly be extended
by the terms of another section, which, assuming the definition of provable debts to be made by Section 63, excepts
certain of then from the general rule that all provable debts
are discharged. The amendments of 1903 do not render
unliquidated claims for such personal torts as seduction and crim. con. provable. They merely exempt
from discharge liabilities for such torts when provable, and
they are provable under Section 63 only when reduced to
judgment. If not reduced to judgment they are not discharged because they are not provable. The language of
Referee Remington in In re Rouse, I A. B. R., is in point.
He said: "It seems to the referee that we must find in Section 63 our limitation as to what claims or debts are and
what are not provable in bankruptcy, and that it is untenable for us to assume that the list is enlarged or its interpretation affected by the wording of Section 17, making
provision as to what debts are not affected by a discharge.
Section 17 expressly refers to 'provable' debts, and we
must therefore seek elsewhere for the determination of what
debts are provable." 42
Stanley Folz.
'

Collier: Bankruptcy (4th Ed.), page 443.

' See also In re Cushing, 6 A. B. R. 22.

